It was the 1978 brainchild of then Colonel Hans Dreyer (later a Major-General in the SAP) to develop and exploit intelligence and was based on the Portuguese Flechas and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. Koevoet was based in Oshakati and suffered 153 killed in action and several hundred more wounded. They killed more than 3,681 SWAPO insurgentswhich resulted in a 1:25 or one to 25 kill ratio.
What I wanted to point out here was a very interesting piece of history that I don’t think has really been discussed out there. Maybe Peter Stiff talked about it in his Covert War book, but either way, I thought I would bring it up here and archive it.
This to me is a prime example of incentivizing warfare, and providing a means of competition within a unit for the destruction of an enemy. To create an industry (competition) out of killing your enemy basically. In this case, the Koevoet attached a value to the enemy(killed or captured) and their weapons/equipment, and established a bounty system that all of Koevoet could partake in and supplement their salaries with. The results were stunning.
Koevoet also gets a big mention for it’s innovative war fighting methods, and the proof of concept for applying the Selous Scout model to a different war and in a different country (see below). In other words, this unit would be an excellent study for how this type of counter-insurgency warfare could be taught, and even by a private company. Look at the effectiveness of this stuff in both Rhodesia and SWA and you can see exactly what I mean. –Matt
Koevoet worked on a bounty policy where anything and everything that you brought in had a price on its head. People somewhere around R2,000, large calibre mortars probably a bit more, land mines slightly less and so on, which was a great motivating factor for the combatants and the teams because you could earn double, triple your money. It also meant that score boards were kept and that the teams competed against each other for the most number of kills in a given week in the bush. –Sean Mark Callahan, Page 30 of the TRC, 17th of June, 1997
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Koevoet From Wikipedia
At the time, South Africa saw itself as the only country on the sub-continent that could stave off the onslaught of communism. As such, South-West Africa and its northern border with Angola was the one battleground that South Africa had to control if it was to weaken the Cuban-backed South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO).
Rising insurgency
In many countries there is a formal separation of duties between law enforcement and the military. The former is generally responsible for domestic issues while the latter is deployed in defence of the nation. At first this philosophy was adopted in South-West Africa. Guerilla operations inside the country were dealt with by the police. Insurgents were seen as common criminals that should be processed by the criminal justice system. However, insurgents used military equipment which normal police officers were not equipped or trained to deal with. A better armed and better trained unit capable of facing such challenges was established within the South-West African Police (SWAPOL) force.
