Feral Jundi

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Afghanistan: The Taliban Pay More Than The Afghan Army?

Filed under: Afghanistan — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 9:43 AM

   I am sorry, but this is unacceptable.  So all along, the Taliban have been paying more for it’s recruits than the Afghan Army has been paying theirs?  Who dropped the ball on this one, because this is huge in my book. For any strategists who would like to learn a quick lesson on war and economics, especially coming from one of us ‘evil security contractors’, the math is simple.  The locals will always go for the best deal possible, and if the Taliban are paying more, then of course they are going to join them.

   It reminds me of the latest GAO report on the State Department’s problem with trying hire enough supervisors to manage the WPPS crew.  If you pay so little for a position like this, what do you expect? Of course contractors are not going to sign up for such a thing.  I love the phrase, ‘pay peanuts and you get monkeys’.  Well in this case, the applicable phrase is that you ‘get what you pay for’.

   Not to mention the fact that every village and tribe out there is hedging their bets right now as to who will be in charge a year from now, five years from now, ten years from now, and etc.  If survival means working for their cousin up in the hills as a ‘little T’ or contract Taliban, and make a little money off the venture, then so be it.  Until the government of Afghanistan can show that it is not corrupt and that it is willing to actually pay their guys a decent salary, then of course these folks are gonna go for the better deal.

     The Afghan Army has to show capability as well, and if they lack motivation or discipline to accomplish the mission of killing the Taliban and company, then why would anyone want to join them? Success breeds success, and everyone likes a winner.

   Glad to see someone woke up and realized that this needed fixing. I think the Army will definitely see an uptick in recruits and in retention, and in turn, less recruits for the Taliban. Duh.

    The other question though is how long can we, I mean the Afghans, pay for these salaries?  Unlike Iraq with it’s oil, Afghanistan really has nothing to pay for anything. –Matt

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Pay increase for Afghan troops boosts interest

APPLICATIONS ARE ON THE RISE

Obama strategy depends on well-trained force

By Glenn KesslerThursday, December 10, 2009

KABUL — A recent pay increase for Afghan troops and police appears to have resulted in a surge of applicants, said the top U.S. military official for Afghan security training.

Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, citing Afghan statistics, said 2,659 Afghans had applied to join the security forces in the first seven days of this month, about half of the month’s recruiting objective. In the three previous months, recruiting fell short of targets, with only 830 applicants in September, he said.

President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan, which calls for 30,000 U.S. reinforcements next year, depends heavily on the rapid development of a well-trained Afghan force that can begin to take over security from U.S. and NATO forces. Afghanistan has about 97,000 troops and 95,000 police officers, but they are poorly trained, have high turnover rates and are prone to corruption.

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Legal News: A Check on Faint-hearted Presidents–Letters of Marque and Reprisal, by William Young

Filed under: Legal News — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 7:13 AM

   This is an excellent treatment of the subject.  If you have the time to review the legal side of the LoM and all of it’s modern day implications, I highly recommend reading this. One note for the author though.  During World War Two, Congress issued a LoM, and that technically was the last one issued.  Eeben might be able to add some more corrections in reference to EO, but that was about it for corrections. I might have added some more relevant companies for the discussion of contractor capability, but that was about it. –Matt

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A Check on Faint-Hearted Presidents: Letters of Marque and Reprisal

By William Young

Volume 66, Issue 2, Spring 2009

Washington and Lee University School of Law

VII.  Conclusion

Letters of marque and reprisal provide a method with which Congress can check a lack of presidential initiative in future military conflicts.  Within certain constraints, the Constitution allows Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal to private contractors, allowing Congress to enlist private contractors to accomplish military objectives that the President refuses to support.  Congress’s decision to issue letters of marque and reprisal against the will of the President,

however, will be a balancing act of risk and reward.  The risks are many, substantial, and unpredictable, and may involve great injury and serious consequences both domestically and internationally.  The injury, or potential injury, to the United States must be so great that Congress feels it has no choice but to accept these risks in an attempt to prevent or redress that injury.

*****

(A section talking about the Executive Outcomes example and funding for such a thing.)

     Second, the lack of funding requirements (other than the limitation that the U.S. government cannot fund the privateers) might give Congress greater operational latitude in issuing letters of marque and reprisal.  As noted in the

discussion of EO, private firms are capable of altering the military landscape on a regional level.170  One could envision a scenario in which Congress, against the President’s wishes, feels that a large scale military action is necessary.

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Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Industry Talk: U.S. Seeks New Guards in Kabul

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 7:59 AM

   Finally.  Now lets hope that they will square this stuff away and do what is necessary to prevent this from getting out of hand again in the future.  I would also hope that the State Department would fire a few folks responsible for not doing what was necessary to control this contract and maintain order starting back in 2007.

   Now one thing I hope doesn’t happen, is that the good guys on this contract who didn’t do anything wrong, don’t get shoved onto some black list.  That is stupid.  The folks who are at fault, are the leaders, and those are the ones that should be on a black list.  To put everyone that was ever involved with this contract on some dorkwad list, or who had worked for AGNA at one point or another on a no hire list, is not right.  Identify who the problem children were, and put them on the black list if need be.

    And for those guys who are innocent of any wrong doing or got caught up in this poorly managed mess, I wish you well and I really hope this doesn’t tarnish your chances for future employment.

   The other story on this, is check out David Isenberg’s article at PMH about IPOA and it’s slow progress on the investigation of complaints in regards to Armor Group North America’s performance. Especially after it was brought up at the hearing. –Matt

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U.S. Seeks New Guards in Kabul

December 9, 2009

By AUGUST COLE

The State Department plans to seek new bids to protect the U.S. Embassy in Kabul after the current firm ran into staffing and oversight problems.

The company, ArmorGroup North America, a unit of Wackenhut Services Inc., will be allowed to bid on the new contract, the State Department said.

“The recent allegations of misconduct and various contract compliance deficiencies led us to conclude it was in the best interest of the government to compete a new contract,” said P.J. Crowley, assistant secretary of state for public affairs.

The plan to rebid the contract was earlier disclosed by the Project on Government Oversight, an independent watchdog group that in September released lurid photos and videos of ArmorGroup guards at a party.

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Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Industry Talk: GAO Report Critical of State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 8:20 AM

     FP is right.  The surge is happening, and the civilian surge will be coming right along with it.  All of those folks are gonna need security, and DoS needs to prepare for that big time. I didn’t know that DoS was this bad off, and you would think that there would have been plenty of lessons learned to guide them and prepare them for future needs.  WPPS will be big in Afghanistan, and how anyone could have missed the planning and preparation for this, is beyond me. –Matt

Edit: 12/09/09 Check out Danger Room’s post on the same thing here.

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Exclusive: GAO report rips State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau

From Foreign Policy

Mon, 12/07/2009

The State Department is tripling its civilian presence in Afghanistan, which will require a huge increase in the amount of security needed to look after those civilians. But State’s bureau in charge of protecting its personnel is already stretched thin and the Afghanistan surge could only exacerbate its administrative and strategic shortfalls, according to a soon-to-be-released GAO report, obtained exclusively by The Cable.

It’s a fact of life that operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are a now a huge part of the mission for the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which protects diplomats all over the world. That’s somewhat a legacy of Condoleezza Rice’s “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative, which was meant to expand the U.S. diplomatic presence to include more robust efforts in more dangerous places. Outposts that might have been closed have been kept open, such as in Lahore, Pakistan, putting added burdens on the diplomatic security infrastructure, the report states.

Success in Afghanistan depends on improving the Afghan government and “that makes civilian efforts as vital as military operations and of longer duration,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said just before last Tuesday’s announcement by the president. “We have begun to elevate diplomacy and development alongside defense in our national security strategy, and we are certainly engaged in doing so in Afghanistan.”

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Strategy: How the Taliban Take a Village, and How We Can Take it Back

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Matt @ 7:27 AM

   This is a simple matter of understanding the Taliban strategy, and the best way to counter it.  I highly suggest reading Maj. Jim Gant’s paper on his Tribal Engagement Teams TET concept, and then reading these three articles and posts below about what the Taliban are actually doing in Afghanistan.

   My personal opinion is that this TET plan will be a necessity as we force all the Taliban out of the main population centers, and they run for the hills.  The insurgent will always attack weakness with strength, and if we don’t care about these villages and tribes up in the hills, well then that will be the target of the insurgent.  And in their case, they will go where we cannot or will not go.  Geography, distance, manpower, money are all things that stops the government and the coalition forces from being everywhere at once.  Geography is what separates these small villages and tribes from the government.  The Taliban will only help to add to that separation by insuring that they are the nodes of influence out there in the hinter lands.  Will our surge of troops be able to protect those villages in a country the size of Texas, and completely divided up by rough terrain? Or would a smaller operation like the TET program do a better job?

   I think if we want to be successful in the war effort there, then use the troops to secure the population centers and create a safe haven for those local populations.  But use the TET game plan for the various tribes located in the backwoods. It makes sense, and is more cost effective.  The goal should be to be to take back the villages or help out those that need it, install the nodes of influence necessary to keep the tribes and villages on our side, and hunt the ‘Big T’ or hard core Taliban like dogs and keep them off balance, confused, and fearing for their lives.

   That last sentence is important to me, and should be important to this strategy.  Protecting the populations center should not all be just defense.  Offense is necessary too, and these TET programs will provide some excellent intelligence and some excellent recruits for future offensive operations.  We must empower the tribes to not only defend themselves from these Big T schmucks, but teach them how to keep these guys on the run.  The Jezailchis Scouts is one concept that Cannoneer #4 and myself have been talking about for a bit, and it is worth a look.  Because not only must we teach the tribes to defend self, we must also teach them how to hunt and eradicate a mutual enemy. It would be the gift that would keep giving, long after we have left Afghanistan and that tribe.

     What the Jezailchis Scouts would look like will be another post. Think of them as a combination of well trained snipers, with excellent man tracking and scouting skills. You could also form them up, much like the Selous Scouts formed up their teams, and use these scouts in similar ways. (collecting information as undercover Taliban, etc.) These guys would be the best hunters and the pride and joy of the tribes.  The Jezailchis Scouts would be a killing mechanism, that would be designed to keep doing it’s thing naturally and efficiently, well after everyone is gone.  It would be good for us, good for Afghanistan, good for the tribes and hellish for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. –Matt

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On War #325: How the Taliban Take a Village (Lind/Sexton)

William S. LindDecember 7, 2009

EDITOR’S NOTE: The following is a guest column, written by a reserve NCO with Special Forces, Mark Sexton. It is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan. It represents his analysis only, not any position taken by DOD, the U.S. Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government. In my opinion, it represents exactly the sort of intelligence analysis we need but seldom get.

How the Taliban Take a Village

A current method used by Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership operating from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of local population with the modus operandi being to gain their cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).

VILLAGE NODES OF INFLUENCE

For a non-Afghan or foreigner to understand how the Taliban can subvert a village, we can use a simple social structure model to identify the key nodes of influence within a typical Afghan village. A village can be divided into three areas that most affect how daily life is lived. These areas generally fall under political and administrative, religious, and security. These three areas can be considered key nodes of influence in every Afghan village. Of the three nodes the one that is the most visible to outsiders is that of the Malik and village elders. The Malik and village elders represent the political aspects of the village. A second key node of influence is the Imam. The Imam represents the religious node of influence within a village. A third Local node of influence is the individuals and system of security found within a village. Security is traditionally conducted by the men of each individual village. If one of the parts or nodes of influence is controlled by either the Taliban or the Afghan government in each village, then they heavily influence or control villages and the area.

TALIBAN CONTROL OF VILLAGE NODES

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